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We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, 
pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical 
results suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, 
whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. 
Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology 
influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or pro-
ducer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts.     
JEL-Classification: N83, O32, L14  





                                        
∗   We would like to thank Christoph Engel, seminar participants in Bonn, Bochum, Hanover, 
Yale and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments. Moreover, we would like to 
thank the staff of the corporate archives of BASF, Bayer, Merck, and Siemens, the staff of His-
tocom (Hoechst archive) and of Deutsches Technikmuseum Berlin (AEG archive). Brian 
Cooper substantially improved the writing of the paper. Financial support of the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.     
‡   Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern & Universität Köln 
†   Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern 2 
I.   Introduction 
Today, licenses are a common instrument of the owners of patents to make their innovation ac-
cessible to other users. This is, in general, good for users as well as innovators, since it generates 
profits and license fees for licensor and licensee. Consequently, many innovators share their pa-
tents via licensing contracts: In a survey of U.S. patent holders, nearly 18 percent of all patents in 
the respondents’ patent portfolio were licensed (Scotchmer, 2006: 161). Moreover, about 20 per-
cent of the foreign direct investment income of U.S. multinational companies is currently gener-
ated from technology licensing agreements (Vishwasrao, 2007). 
Prospering markets for technology are not a recent phenomenon. They already existed in the 
U.S. during the mid-19
th century facilitating the transfer of patents from individual inventors to 
firms. In particular, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999, 2001) demonstrate that a large fraction of 
U.S. patents were fully or partially assigned by the inventor. During the 1870s, inventors com-
mercialised their ideas themselves, but often granted geographically bounded licenses to produc-
ers in distant regions. At the turn of the century, innovation and commercialisation were increas-
ingly separated activities and inventors sold or licensed their patents to firms. The use of licenses 
to commercialise innovations is also highlighted by Khan and Sokoloff (1993) and by 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2000), who describe some of the licensing contracts closed by Ameri-
ca’s great inventors during the 19
th-century and the means of technology transfer in the Ameri-
can glass industry in the late 19
th- and early 20
th-century, respectively. The processes culminated 
with the outsourcing of research tasks and close collaboration between in-house researchers and 
specialised free-standing research laboratories (Mowery, 1983).  
Patent assignments and licensing contracts were also used in Germany since the late 19
th century. 
Burhop (2010) shows that 8.3 percent of all patents issued in Germany between the 1880s and 
World War I were transferred. Beyond such aggregate data, case studies of innovation procure-
ment of German chemical and pharmaceutical companies at the turn of the 20
th century suggest a 
significant flow from outside inventions into new products. For example, Wimmer (1994) and 
Burhop (2009) illustrate that professionally managed in-house pharmaceutical product develop-
ment was constricted to Bayer, whereas Hoechst and Merck procured new products from univer-
sities and free-lance inventors and only improved the production process in-house. Furthermore, 
Burhop (2009) shows that Hoechst, Merck, BASF, and Bayer acquired a large number of patents 
on the technology market. Between 1891 and 1913, these firms developed close to 5,000 patents 
in-house and acquired about 150 patents on the market. This seems to be a small number, but 
most of the external inventions were very valuable. For example, the ten most successful drugs 
sold by Merck between 1891 and 1918 were all invented by outside inventors. For Hoechst, 
Wimmer (1994: 183) demonstrates a similar relevance of outside inventors: 21 out of 24 best-
selling drugs were procured from outsiders. In addition, Wimmer (1994) and Burhop (2009) 
show that most patents granted to Hoechst and Merck were patents improving an outside ac-
quired technology.    3 
So far, no comprehensive historical study on the licensing activity and the design of licensing 
contracts of German companies is available. Only some evidence from studies that focus on ei-
ther the research activities or the general history of specific companies exists. In his study on the 
synthetic dye research programmes of BASF and Hoechst, Reinhardt (1997) gives a detailed ac-
count of the companies’ cooperation with individual researchers. In addition, he briefly mentions 
licensing agreements that BASF and Hoechst closed with other companies. For the pharmaceuti-
cal research activities of Bayer, Hoechst, and Merck, Wimmer (1994) provides details about the-
se companies’ cooperation with individual researchers, too. Furthermore, he also investigates in 
depth several licensing contracts with companies. Some information on both, licensing contracts 
with companies and the cooperation with individual researchers is available in Abelshauser’s 
(2002) monograph on the corporate history of BASF, Burhop’s (2009) article on Merck, Rein-
hardt’s (1995) work on pharmaceutical research at BASF, and Reinhardt and Travis’ (2000) 
study on Heinrich Caro, BASF’s head of research. Finally, Pohl (1988) and Strunk (2000) as 
well as Feldenkirchen (2003) and Weiher and Goetzler (1981) here and there refer to licensing 
contracts closed by the electrical engineering firms AEG and Siemens, but hardly ever offer de-
tailed information on the agreements. Thus, a number of case studies are available. However, 
they lack a common structure, making comparison and analysis in light of theory difficult.1    
Economic theory has produced scores of models explaining licensing activity and the optimal 
structure of contracts. The typical model starts with the assumption that a licensing market ex-
ists2 and that contracts are structured around a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty to address strate-
gic concerns of the licensor regarding the product market behaviour of the licensee (see, e.g., the 
seminal model by Gallini and Wright, 1992). More recently, theorists focus on issues like uncer-
tainty, risk aversion, and moral hazard. Section III of this paper give a short review of key licens-
ing models.   
Our empirical results, presented in Sections IV and V, based on 180 licensing contracts closed in 
Germany’s chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering industries between 1880 and 
1913, suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, 
whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be hardly rele-
vant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed tech-
nology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements 
or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts. Beyond our contribution 
to economic history, we thus contribute to the empirical industrial organization literature. Most 
empirical studies investigating licensing contracts do not contain much information about the 
details of the contracts. The main reason for this gap is that the licensing agreements are private 
contracts, which are unobservable to the researcher most of the time. For example, less than ten 
percent of licensors sent the questionnaire back in one of the most comprehensive studies of li-
censing contracts (Brousseau et al., 2007). Consequently, econometric investigations of licensing 
                                        
1   In a recent contribution, Lübbers (2009) analyzed cross-licensing agreements and thereby complements our 
paper, which base exclusively on one-way licensing agreements. 
2   See, e.g., Arora et al., 2007, for a general discussion of the problems related to the existence of technology 
markets 4 
behaviour often employ binary choice variables indicating if a licensing contract was closed (or 
not) as dependent variable and a set of observable firm- or industry-specific variables as explana-
tory variables (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Starting with the work by Mendi (2005) and Vish-
wasrao (2007), researchers evaluated official forms filled by the licensees of cross-country li-
censing agreements to evaluate the content of licensing contracts. The official forms, however, 
do not contain the original licensing contract, but only some binary coded information of interest 
to the government. More recently, Sakakibara (2010) evaluated a sample of licensing contracts 
closed by Japanese firms during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
II.   Historical background 
During the second half of the 19
th century, Germany was transformed from a rural economy to 
one of the leading industrialised countries in the world. Between 1851 and 1913, the real net na-
tional product (NNP) increased by almost 2.5 per cent per annum (Burhop and Wolff, 2005). At 
the same time, the share of the agrarian sector in the German workforce decreased at the expense 
of the industrial sector (Pierenkemper and Tilly, 2004, 18-21). The leading sectors in the early 
years of Germany’s industrialisation were transportation (i.e., railways) and also, to a smaller 
extent, iron and steel production as well as mining. Then, from the 1870s onwards, in an acceler-
ating process that is often referred to as the ‘Second Industrial Revolution’, two other sectors 
gained ever greater importance: the chemical industry and electrical engineering. 
The growth of the chemical industry was, first of all, fuelled by advances in the fabrication of 
synthetic dyes from coal tar. Later on, pharmaceutical innovations and breakthroughs in inorgan-
ic chemistry became almost equally important.3 Between 1891 and 1913, the output of the chem-
ical sector increased by an annual rate of 6.4 per cent (Hoffmann, 1965, 361-362). The growth 
rate of electrical engineering was even more impressive: Total sales in the sector grew on aver-
age by more than 16 percent annually during the same period (Schulz-Hanßen, 1970, 29-31). The 
major factor behind this impressive growth was the introduction of electrical energy and its utili-
sation in a wide area of applications, such as transportation, lightning, and power generation.4 
The Second Industrial Revolution can also be understood by looking at patenting activity. By 
investigating long-living patents (i.e., patents in force for at least ten years), Streb et al. (2006) 
identify four major technology booms between 1877 and 1918. The first boom occurred between 
1877 and 1886. It is labelled “railway wave”, since most valuable patents were used in this in-
dustry. The second and the third boom (1887 to 1896 and 1897 to 1902) were shaped by the 
chemical industry and are labelled the “dye wave” and the “chemical wave”, respectively. The 
final boom, which lasted from 1903 up to the end of the First World War, is identified as the 
“wave of electrical engineering”.  
                                        
3   On the development of the chemical industry in Germany, Europe, and the USA, see Beer (1959); Haber 
(1958); Homburg, Travis, and Schröter (1998). 
4   On the development of electrical engineering, see the literature on the two major companies, AEG (Pohl, 
1988; Strunk, 2000) and Siemens (Feldenkirchen, 2003; Kocka, 1969). 5 
Apart from the impressive quantitative changes, an important qualitative innovation took place 
during the late 19
th and early 20
th century: the incorporation of science into industrial production 
and the industrialisation of scientific research. Beginning in the 1870s, the companies from the 
chemical industry made increasing use of the abundant reservoir of scientifically trained chem-
ists: at first, by deepening their cooperation with universities and other external research facili-
ties;5 then, in a next step, by the internalisation of scientific research. The major companies from 
the chemical industry – BASF, Bayer, and Hoechst – hired an ever-growing number of universi-
ty-trained scientists between the late 1870s and early 1890s and founded central research labora-
tories (Homburg, 1992). Electrical engineering profited from the translation of engineering from 
a practically orientated occupation to a scientific discipline that was taught at universities and 
other institutions of higher education (König, 1996). In addition, and as a result of this develop-
ment, the companies from this sector also increased their research staff. However, the internali-
sation of scientific research was not conducted on the same scale and with the same rigour as in 
the chemical industry.6 
Apart from substantial investment in universities and other research facilities, an important polit-
ical contribution to the emergence of the knowledge-based economy was the enactment of the 
first federal German patent law in 1877. In the preceding years, a patchwork of numerous patent 
legislations existed in the individual German states, and in many cases, the state authorities re-
garded patents as privileges rather than as rights.7 The first federal patent law of 1877 included 
some stipulations that supported the interest of industrial companies vis-à-vis individual inven-
tors. At first, a patent did not necessarily belong to the inventor, but was granted to the person or 
institution who registered it at the patent office.8 This stipulation allowed companies to apply for 
patents of inventions made by their employees in the companies’ names. Thus, it facilitated their 
research activities based on division of labour.9 Second, a patented invention had to be worked. 
If the patentee did not do so herself or licensed the patent, the protection could disappear after 
three years. In effect, this stipulation favoured companies over individual inventors, as individu-
als were usually unable to produce an invention themselves. Furthermore, the duty to use a pa-
tent hindered strategic patenting behaviour aimed at the blockade of market entrants, because 
companies could not apply for a wide range of patents in one line of business without being able 
or willing to use all the property rights. Third, all patent applications were made subject to a 
thorough pre-examination by the German patent office, which had to judge whether the applica-
tion really constituted a patentable invention (Seckelmann, 2006, 257-260). This stipulation 
                                        
5   There are numerous studies on the linkage between the state, universities, and the chemical industry. See, 
e.g., Borscheid (1976), Murmann (2006), and Wetzel (1991). 
6   Siemens had not created a central research laboratory until the beginning of the 1920s. However, this does 
not mean that that no research took place within the company, but that it was decentralised in diffferent de-
partments and various small laboratories. On the development of research at Siemens, see Erker (1990), Hack 
(1998: 109-118), Trendelenburg (1975: 1-50), and Schubert (1987). A comprehensive study on the organisa-
tion of research at AEG is not available. 
7   For the history of the patent laws of different German territories, see Heggen (1975), Seckelmann (2006, 57-
106). 
8   The patent law of 1877 and the revised version of 1891 are printed in Seckelmann (2006, 427-436, 440-451). 
9   The emerging moral hazard problem inside the firm was solved by closing incentive contracts with the em-
ployed scientists (Burhop and Lübbers, 2010). 6 
again hindered the blockade of actual or potential competitors, as it also reduced the possibility 
of extensive patenting. Finally, the patent fees that had to be paid annually in order to uphold a 
patent for another year were designed progressively.10 These again favoured companies over 
individual inventors, as the latter might in many cases not have been able to pay the renewal 
fees. Moreover the high renewal fees also hindered excessive patenting activity and a blockade 
of technological progress, as a patent owner would uphold meaningful and valuable patents only. 
For the emergence of the market for technology licenses, some of the above-mentioned peculi-
arities of the German patent law proved beneficial: The compulsory working of a patent and the 
progressive nature of the renewal fee must have substantially increased the willingness of indi-
vidual inventors – and also of firms – to share their findings with industrial partners, as they 
would have been unable to exploit them themselves. Moreover, the in-depth pre-examination by 
the patent office increased potential licensees’ willingness to pay, as it made it less likely that a 
patent would be successfully attacked by litigation once it was granted.11  
III.   Theory  
The theoretical literature about the optimal design of technology licensing contracts is quite ad-
vanced and far ahead of empirical contributions. Early papers investigate strategic considerations 
of an innovative firm to license a new technology to a competing firm. More recently, extensions 
and variations of classical licensing models consider risk-aversion, moral hazard, and uncertain-
ty. In general, the models yield partly conflicting results regarding the optimal contract structure. 
Thus, depending on the model, the optimal contract can contain a fixed upfront payment, fixed 
annual payments, or payments if certain milestones are reached, per-unit royalties, turnover or 
profit shares.  
It is important to note that per-unit royalties and turnover sharing agreements typically imply 
deadweight losses, whereas milestones, fixed payments, and profit shares do not affect aggregate 
welfare. For example, if a technology is licensed to only one producer, this monopolist maximis-
es his profit if marginal revenues equal marginal costs. A per-unit royalty obviously affects the 
cost function – marginal costs are higher, the optimal output therefore lower. In a similar way, a 
turnover sharing agreement affects the revenue function. Thus, this type of contract also induces 
a deadweight loss. In contrast, profit sharing agreements neither affect the revenue nor the cost 
function. Moreover, any kind of fixed transfer (upfront, annually, milestone) does not influence 
the first order conditions. Thus, profit sharing agreements and any kind of fixed payments do not 
induce deadweight losses. Yet, profit sharing agreements are often difficult to enforce since the 
profits stemming from one specific licensing agreement have to be calculated. Thus, relatively 
                                        
10   The fee was 50 Mark for the first and 50 Mark for the second year. Afterwards, the fee increased by 50 Mark 
each year. If a patentee wanted to uphold a patent for the maximum period of 15 years, he thus had to pay 
700 Mark in the last year and 5,300 Mark in total. This compares to an annual per capita income of about 800 
Mark in 1913. 
11   Secure property rights were also highlighted by Khan (1995) and Khan and Sokoloff (2004) as relevant for 
the emergence of the U.S. market for patent assignments and technology licenses.   7 
high monitoring and enforcement costs of profit sharing agreements make milestones an attrac-
tive contractual choice.      
Early licensing models focus on strategic considerations of an innovative and simultaneously 
producing firm licensing a technology to a competing firm. In such a case, per-unit royalties or 
turnover shares can be used to influence the marginal costs of the licensee and thereby the licen-
sor controls the optimal output of the licensee. Thus, strategic considerations of the licensor re-
sult into a contract which maximizes the income of the licensor, but which is inefficient from an 
aggregate welfare perspective. In addition, a fixed fee helps that the participation constraints of 
licensor and licensee are satisfied, i.e. that a licensing contract is signed at all. Moreover, if fu-
ture profits are known ex ante, the present value of royalties can be calculated and transformed 
into a fixed upfront payment. Thus, contracts containing only a fixed upfront payment can be 
optimal under certain circumstances (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro, 1985; Kamien and Tau-
man, 1986; Wang, 1998).  
An important extension of this classical set-up is the model proposed by Bousquet et al. (1998). 
They consider a world with uncertainty for all parties regarding the amount of cost savings real-
ized using an innovation or the profits generated producing a new product. Moreover, they as-
sume a risk-averse licensee, whereas the licensor is risk-neutral.12 Under cost uncertainty and 
with a risk-averse licensee, per-unit royalties can increase aggregate utility, since the insurance 
effect of a royalty can overcompensate for the output distortion induced by the per-unit royalty. 
A risk-averse firm gets higher utility from a low, but save payment compared to a potentially 
high, but risky payment. A similar result holds in case of demand uncertainty. Again, a risk-
averse licensee has a preference for insurance. In case of demand uncertainty, Bousquet et al. 
(1998) show that the best licensing contract is a turnover sharing agreement combined with a 
per-unit royalty or a turnover sharing agreement combined with a non-negative fixed fee. In sum, 
the type of innovation can substantially affect optimal contract design in case of uncertainty and 
risk-averse licensees.  
The effect of moral hazard on the design of optimal licensing contracts has been investigated by 
Jensen and Thursby (2001). They start from the assumption that an external, risk-neutral innova-
tor licenses a new technology to a risk-neutral producer. The new technology is not fully devel-
oped at the time the licensing agreement is signed and some effort of the inventor is necessary to 
get the new product to the market or to put the new process into use.13 The inventor dislikes ef-
fort but likes money and the licensee must thus choose a contract that motivates the licensor to 
put effort into the new technology after the contract has been signed. The effort of the licensor is 
increasing in the per-unit royalty (or turnover share) as long as the income from this source in-
creases. However, the per-unit royalty (or turnover share) affects the optimization conditions of 
the licensee and it is possible that the profit maximizing output choice of the licensee is too low 
to yield the royalty income necessary to induce optimal licensor effort. In contrast, the optimal 
                                        
12   Jensen and Thursby (2001) model risk-aversion of the licensor in a moral hazard framework. 
13   Agrawal (2006) shows that an increased level of engagement of the licensor by the licensee after signing of a 
licensing contract increases the odds of commercialisation of a product substantially.  8 
effort as well as the optimal output is always realized whenever licensor and licensee sign a prof-
it sharing contract, since a profit share does neither affect the cost nor the revenue function of the 
producer. Consequently, if a high effort of the inventor is necessary to get the innovation into 
use, it is possible that such a high effort is only possible with a royalty rate higher than the li-
censing-revenue-maximizing royalty rate. Thus, the moral hazard problem cannot be fully solved 
in this case. This cannot occur in profit-sharing agreements since the effort is strictly increasing 
in the profit share.14  
A major problem of profit sharing agreements are high monitoring and information costs associ-
ated with such agreements. In general, the licensee has to calculate the profits resulting from a 
specific licensing agreement and the licensor has to audit this calculation. To circumvent 
deadweight losses resulting from per-unit royalties or turnover sharing agreements as well as 
monitoring problems resulting from profit sharing agreements, Dechenaux et al. (2009) propose 
milestone payments of the licensee to the licensor to solve the moral hazard problem. Whenever 
a certain, well-defined milestone (e.g. patent grant, first product sold etc.) is reached, the licensor 
receives a payment from the licensee. Thus milestones solve the same problem as profit-sharing 
contracts, i.e., milestones can complement or substitute profit-shares in contract choice. Closely 
related is the model proposed by Dechenaux et al. (2011). They consider a risk-averse licensee 
using milestones to overcome moral hazard. If the licensee is risk-averse she does not like mile-
stone payments based on technical success. In the worst case, the invention is a technical suc-
cess, but a commercial failure. In this case, the inventor receives milestone payments and the 
producer makes a loss. If the inventor is risk-neutral, part of the milestone payment can be re-
placed by a turnover share or a per-unit royalty. Thus, milestone payments and per-unit royalties 
(or turnover shares) can be simultaneously contained in a licensing agreement.15  
IV.   Data sources and descriptive statistics 
The information on the licensing agreements evaluated in this paper is gathered from archival 
sources. We selected seven companies for our study.16 Three of them – Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-
Gesellschaft (AEG), Telefunken, and Siemens – were engaged in electrical engineering, the oth-
er four – Bayer, BASF, Hoechst, and Merck – are from the chemical and pharmaceutical indus-
try. Our sample thus covers the major companies from the two leading sectors of the Second In-
                                        
14   Aghion and Tirole (1994a, 1994b) are concerned with the optimal distribution of profit shares if effort of 
both parties, licensor and licensee, is necessary to develop the invention towards the market. For example, 
inventor effort is useful to improve the new technology, whereas the producer has to invest into production 
facilities or marketing of the new product. The main proposition of Aghion and Tirole is that the higher the 
necessary effort of one party, the higher its profit shares. 
 
15   Moreover, Dechenaux et al. (2011) demonstrate that the incentive pay of the inventor can be replaced by a 
fixed consulting fee if the producer can (perfectly) monitor the consulting effort of the inventor. For example, 
the inventor can work in the laboratories of the producers to improve the licensed technology to the market. 
16   This seems to be a small sample, but since we hand-collected the data from corporate archives, we decided to 
focus on firms active in technology-intensive branches. Moreover, the records of the firms must be available 
for inspection. 9 
dustrial Revolution. BASF, Bayer, and Hoechst were the dominant players on the market for 
synthetic dyes and – with the exception of BASF – also in the fabrication of pharmaceutical in-
novations. Merck was of smaller size and engaged in pharmaceuticals and specialised chemicals. 
AEG, Siemens, and their joint-venture Telefunken dominated electrical engineering.17  
In total, we were able to gather 180 licensing contracts closed between 1880 and 1914. 159 of 
the contracts are from the chemical and pharmaceutical industry and 21 are from electrical engi-
neering companies. Most of the available contracts from the chemical and pharmaceutical com-
panies were closed during the 1890s, a slightly smaller number in the years between the turn of 
the century and the First World War. For the electrical engineering companies, 20 out of 21 
agreements are from the 20
th century. In 169 cases, the seven firms were the licensees, in the re-
maining eleven the licensors. 74 contracts are from Hoechst, 42 from Bayer, 28 from Merck, 
nine from Telefunken, six from Siemens, six from BASF, and four from AEG.18  
From all of the 180 licensing contacts, we were able to gather information on the following fea-
tures: 1) contracting parties, 2) scope of the agreement, 3) licensing fees, 3) duration of the con-
tract, 4) pre- or post-patent contracting and 5) auditing rights. Only in two cases, an individual 
appeared as licensee. The findings on the licensors are less clear-cut. Overall, in one-fourth of 
the available contracts, the licensor was a company, in the remaining cases one or more individ-
uals licensed the product or process.19 Furthermore, in one out of six contracts, strategic behav-
iour might have influenced contract design since both, licensor and licensee, were firms active in 









                                        
17   We were unable to collect firm-specific data since two of the firms (Merck, Telefunken) were non-listed 
companies without any obligation to publish information. Moreover, even the published information of listed 
companies (e.g. turnover, profit, number of employees) is in general unavailable in a comparable format.  
18   It is quite difficult to locate licensing agreements in the files of the seven firms. For one firm, AEG, we dis-
covered aggregate information about licensing of this firm between 1891 and 1913. The total number of li-
censing contracts closes by AEG during that period was about 1,000; only four of them could be located in 
the archive.  10 
TABLE 1:  
FRACTION OF LICENSING CONTRACTS CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING CLAUSE 









Number of observations  159  21 
 
180 
Firm as licensor  20.1 %  57.1 %  0.000  24.4 % 
Strategic licensing possible  13.2 %  38.1 %  0.004  16.1 % 
Payment  Up-front fix  25.2 %  47.6 %  0.039  27.8 % 
Annual fix  9.4 %  9.5 %  0.989  9.4 % 
Inventor milestone  7.5 %  0.0 %  0.194  6.7 % 
Producer milestone  26.4 %  4.8 %  0.029  23.9 % 
Profit share  71.7 %  0.0 %  0.000  63.3 % 
Revenue share  8.2 %  66.7 %  0.000  15.0 % 
Quantity share  17.0 %  33.3 %  0.081  18.9 % 
Duration  Patent duration  86.8 %  61.9 %  0.008  83.9 % 
Years  14.8 years  8.4 years  13.0 years 
Exclusive license  89.3 %  61.9 %  0.003  86.1 % 
Auditing right  21.4 %  42.9 %  0.001  23.9 % 
Pre-patent contracting  57.9 %  23.8 %  0.004  53.9 % 
Source: Archival database. Fisher’s exact test tests the null hypothesis of equal means in the two samples. 
 
Our data indicate that individual inventors transferred technology to firms, which have better 
complementary assets to use the technology. Some individual inventors interacted several times 
with the same firm. For example, Alfred Baeyer licensed in 1880 a process for synthetic indigo 
and in 1887 a process for fuchsine to Bayer. His student Emil Fischer also got into a long-term 
relationship with Bayer. Between 1905 and 1913, Fischer licensed five inventions to this firm. 
Moreover, the case of Fischer indicates that competition between firms existed. In 1903 and 
1905, Fischer licensed innovations to Hoechst and Merck. Competition between firms and long 
term relations with a certain firm can also be observed in the case of Joseph von Mering. Be-
tween 1897 and 1903, von Mering licensed three products to Merck. Later on, in 1905, he li-
censed another product to Hoechst. Other examples for multiple interactions between certain 
inventors and firms are documented in the data. Oscar Hinsberg licensed two products to 
Hoechst – the first in 1902, the second in 1910. Furthermore, Karl Fries licensed three innova-
tions to Hoechst between 1904 and 1912.      
Turning to licensing fees, we find that upfront fixed payments were more common in electrical 
engineering, but less often contracted in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In the former, almost 
half of the licensing agreements included an upfront fixed payment; in the latter, in roughly one 
                                                                                                                           
19   The great importance of individual inventors for the development of new technology has been highlighted by 
Nicholas (2009, 2010, 2011) for the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan as well as by Burhop 
(2010) for Germany.   11 
quarter of the cases, upfront fixed payments were agreed on. About one-tenth of the contracts in 
both industries specified annual payments. In addition, some contracts from the chemical indus-
try specified milestone payments conditioned on some activity related to the inventor, e.g., the 
grant of a patent or successful clinical trials. In addition, about one quarter of the contracts from 
the chemical industry but only five percent of the contracts from the electrical engineering indus-
try specified a producer milestone. A producer milestone specified a payment to the licensor 
whenever some output or sales milestone was reached.  
 In four contracts from the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, an upfront fixed payment was 
the only payment made. One company, Siemens, hardly ever agreed on upfront fixed payments. 
Only in one of Siemens’ contracts, in which the company appeared as joint licensee with AEG, 
such a payment was included. The average upfront fixed fee amounts to 9,237 Mark. Yet, the 
variation of the upfront fixed fees is substantial, ranging from zero to 630,000 Mark.20    
Nearly all contracts included some kind of variable payment. In general, these took four different 
forms: 1) a percentage of the profits generated by the licensed product or process, 2) a percent-
age of its revenue, 3) per piece or with reference to some other physical attribute (e.g., per kilo, 
per litre, per kilowatt) of the licensed product or process, and 4) other forms of variable pay-
ments (e.g., a percentage of the cost reductions due to the licensed technology). In electrical en-
gineering, fees as a percentage of profits seem to have been uncommon, as they appeared in none 
of the available contracts. In contrast, most of the available agreements from this sector included 
variable payments that were calculated as a percentage of revenues. In almost all other cases, 
fees calculated on the basis of a physical attribute were agreed on. The picture in the chemical 
and pharmaceutical industry looks completely different. Here, variable payments that were cal-
culated as a percentage of profits were the rule. In more than 70 per cent of the cases, the con-
tracting parties agreed on this type of variable payment. Moreover, it should be noticed that the 
sharing rates were relatively high. The average licensor profit share was 20.7 percent, the aver-
age turnover share 10.4 percent.21  
Wimmer (1994) and Burhop (2009) demonstrate that Hoechst and Merck kept detailed product-
specific accounts to calculate the profit shares. Both firms calculated the product-specific profit 
as the turnover less the variable and the fixed costs. The fixed costs (i.e., capital costs) were cal-
culated as a percentage depreciation of the capital goods (machinery, buildings) used for the pro-
duction of each product. The firms kept separate investment accounts for each product. Overhead 
costs were allocated using the turnover of the products as a distribution key. One should note that 
the licensor received a share of the product specific profits, not a share of the patent specific 
profits. Thus, all refinements made by the licensee were automatically covered by the licensing 
agreement. Merck, for example, kept accounts containing information about revenues, produc-
tion costs, and marketing expenditures for up to 78 products during the pre-1913 period. The 
firm tracked the production costs, including the ongoing expenses for chemicals, heating materi-
                                        
20   This compares to a per-capita income of 800 Mark in 1913.  
21   This compares, for example, to an average turnover share of only 3.6 percent in a sample of modern Japanese 
licensing contracts (Sakakibara, 2010). 12 
als, and wages, as well as gathering information about depreciation (capital costs) for the capital 
stock used to produce each product. Overhead costs were also allocated to the products accord-
ing to turnover generated by each product. The accounting method was standardized and, by and 
large, the accounts seem to be undisputed since only one conflict regarding the accounts is doc-
umented for the pre-1913 period. 
The duration of the available licensing agreements was longer in the chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal industry and more often based on the patent duration. In almost 87 per cent of the cases the 
duration of the contract was linked to the duration of the respective patent.22 In the remaining 
cases, the average contract period was 14.8 years. In electrical engineering, the share of those 
contracts whose duration was linked to the duration of the respective patent was substantially 
smaller than in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. However, more than 60 per cent of all 
contracts were of this type. The average contract period of the other agreements was 8.4 years.  
Another difference between the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, on the one hand, and the 
electrical engineering industry, on the other, was the timing of the licensing agreement, i.e., 
whether at the time when the respective contract was closed, a patent on the respective product 
or process had already been granted or whether it was only applied for or intended to be applied 
for. In electrical engineering, in the overwhelming majority of the cases a patent existed at the 
time that the contract was closed. In contrast, in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry licens-
ing contracts were more often agreed on at an early stage of the patenting process. 
V.   Econometric evaluation  
Licensing models yield various and in part conflicting results. Moreover, some important varia-
bles are not directly observable, making an econometric test of the models difficult. Thus, some 
proxy variables are used in the econometric specifications. First strategic behaviour is reflected 
in a dummy variable taking the value one if licensor and licensee are both producers from the 
same industry. Second, fixed upfront fees in combination with some other payments to the licen-
sor indicate risk-aversion of her, whereas fixed upfront payments without any other compensa-
tion scheme indicate the absence of any moral hazard problems or uncertainty regarding the fu-
ture success of an invention. Third, we assume that non-patented inventions or inventions offered 
by individual inventors – who most likely do not possess the resources to develop an invention to 
the market – are early stage inventions. They are more likely to be licensed using a profit-sharing 
agreement or milestone payments. Moreover, looking only at profit-sharing and milestone 
agreements, the profit-share or milestone of the inventor should be higher for early stage inven-
tions. In addition, we differentiate between inventor and producer milestones. If the inventor is 
responsible that a certain milestone (e.g. successful clinical trials, successful patent application) 
is reached, we call it ‘inventor milestone’. If the producer is responsible that a certain milestone 
(e.g. number of units produced or sold) is reached, we call it ‘producer milestone’. Inventor 
                                        
22   The maximum patent duration was 15 years.  13 
milestones should be significant for contract design if licensor moral hazard is important, where-
as producers milestones could indicate producer moral hazard, risk-aversion of the producer or 
uncertainty regarding future profits.   
The licensing models outlined in Section III suggest several hypotheses which can be tested with 
our data. According to the strategic licensing model, a licensor granting a license to a potentially 
competing producer from the same industry uses the licensing contract to determine the optimal 
output choice of the licensee. This can be achieved by a per-unit royalty or a turnover sharing 
contract – the first contract affects the cost function, the latter affects the revenue function. 
Moreover, a fixed upfront payment may be included into the contract to make sure that the par-
ticipation constraints of licensor and licensee are met. We quantify this idea by estimating three 
probit models with different left hand side variables and identical explanatory variables.23 Our 
explanatory variables are the size of the fixed upfront payment and a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if both, licensor and licensee, are firms from the same industry. Using these explan-
atory variables, we assess if licensing contracts contain a per-unit royalty or a turnover sharing 
agreement.24  
Table 2 shows the results. In regression (2a), the dependent variable takes the value one if the 
licensing contract contains a turnover sharing agreement, whereas in regression (2b), the de-
pendent variable takes the value of one if the licensing contract contains a per-unit royalty. In 
regression (2c), the dependent variable takes the value of one if the licensing contract contains a 
turnover sharing agreement or a per-unit royalty. In all three cases (2a), (2b), and (2c), the prob-
ability of having such a clause in the contract is higher when both contracting parties are firms 
from the same industry. The coefficients and marginal effects are significant at a one percent 
level in all three specifications and the marginal effects are substantial. For example, when licen-
sor and licensee are from the same industry, the probability of closing a turnover sharing agree-
ment is 38 percent higher compared to cases when licensor and licensee are not from the same 
industry. Thus, the results presented in Table 2, regressions (2a)-(2c) suggest that strategic con-
cerns affected the design of licensing contracts at the turn of the 20







                                        
23   One should note that most variables are endogenous since all contractual terms are negotiated at the same 
time. However, this type of analysis is the standard approach in the literature. Nonetheless, the reader should 
keep this caveat into mind.  
24   Including firm- or sector dummies into the regression was impossible. 14 














Fixed fee (in 1,000 Mark)  0.002  -0.003  0.002  -0.016** 
Licensor is firm from 
same industry 
1.275*** 0.857*** 1.602*** -2.128*** 
Constant -1.376***  -1.198***  -0.700***  0.733*** 
   Marginal effect 
Fixed fee (in 1,000 Mark)  0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.006** 
Licensor is firm from 
same industry 
0.380*** 0.246*** 0.574*** -0.660*** 
Constant -0.464***  -0.406***  -0.273***  0.284*** 
McFadden R²  0.159  0.062  0.156  0.230 
Prob Chi² test  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  180  180  180  180 
Method: Probit. *,**,*** denotes significance on ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
   
Furthermore, this hypothesis is supported by regression (2d). In this regression, the dependent 
variable takes the value one if the licensing contract includes a profit sharing agreement. As out-
lined in the theoretical section above, profit sharing agreements cannot be used to affect the op-
timal output choice of the licensee. Consequently, profit sharing contracts should be less likely if 
strategic aims of the licensor affect the design of the licensing contract. Indeed, the regression 
coefficient of the variable ‘Licensor is firm from the same industry’ is significantly negative. 
We now turn to uncertainty models with risk-averse licensees. Bousquet et al. (1998) show that 
licensing contracts should include a turnover share and a per-unit royalty or a turnover share and 
a fixed upfront payment in case of demand uncertainty. In case of cost uncertainty, the optimal 
contract usually contains all three instruments – turnover shares, per-unit royalties, and fixed 
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Fixed fee (in 1,000 Mark)  0.003  -0.003  0.003  0.002 
Contract duration in 
years 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Pre-patent  contracting -0.832*** -0.899*** -1.208*** -1.158*** 
Producer milestone  -0.526** 
Constant  1.622*** -1.564*** -1.112*** -0.963*** 
   Marginal effect 
Fixed fee (in 1,000 Mark)  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001 
Contract duration in 
years 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Pre-patent  contracting -0.180*** -0.195*** -0.416*** -0.398*** 
Producer milestone  -0.170** 
Constant  -0.558*** -0.536*** -0.421*** -0.370*** 
McFadden R²  0.108  0.098  0.166  0.184 
Prob Chi² test  0.009  0.025  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  180  180  180  180 
Method: Probit. *,**,*** denotes significance on ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
 
In regression (3a), the dependent variable takes the value one if the contract contains a turnover 
sharing rule. In case of demand uncertainty, the fixed fee should be significant. This is not the 
case. In regression (3b), the dependent variable takes the value one if the contract specifies a per-
unit royalty. In case of cost uncertainty, the fixed fee could be significant. This is not the case. In 
regressions (3c) and (3d), the dependent variable takes the value one if the contract contains ei-
ther a turnover sharing clause or a per-unit royalty. This contract choice is possible in the case of 
demand and cost uncertainty. Moreover, it is not necessary that such a contract contains a fixed 
fee. Thus, our finding of an insignificant impact of fixed upfront payments on variable compen-
sation components is compatible with the model.  
In addition, we try to capture uncertainty directly by including several control variables into the 
regressions. Our first uncertainty proxy is contract duration, measured in years. This variable is 
insignificant in all specifications. The second uncertainty proxy is a dummy variable taking the 
value one if the licensing contract is agreed upon before a patent was granted for the underlying 
technology. The technical screening of the patent application by the patent office guarantees 16 
technical feasibility of the underlying technology. Moreover, the patent guarantees the intellectu-
al property right. Thus, the absence of a patent indicates a higher degree of technical and legal 
uncertainty and this should be addressed by the licensing contract. Therefore, we expect a posi-
tive and significant coefficient. However, in contrast to this hypothesis, the coefficient is signifi-
cantly negative. The absence of a patent reduces the probability of agreeing on either a turnover 
sharing rule or a per-unit royalty by about 20 percent.  
Furthermore, we assess an idea put forward by Dechenaux et al. (2011). They suggest that a risk-
averse licensee may use milestone payments to compensate the licensor. In particular, milestones 
based on the commercial success can substitute turnover shares or per-unit royalties. Indeed, re-
gression (3d) supports this idea. Contracts containing producer milestones are significantly less 
likely to contain turnover sharing clauses or per-unit royalties.  
We now turn to models focusing on inventor moral hazard. The model developed by Jensen and 
Thursby (2001) suggests that a profit-sharing licensing contract is superior to a royalty contract 
if a large amount of inventor effort is necessary to commercialise an innovation. Thus, early-
stage innovations, e.g., non-patented innovations and innovations made by individual inventors 
should be more likely to be licensed using profit-sharing contracts since they potentially require 
substantial effort of the inventor after licensing the technology. Moreover, theory suggests that 
the level of fixed upfront payments can influence the contract design if the innovator is risk-
averse. We put three hypotheses to an econometric test: (i) non-patented innovations and innova-
tions offered by individual inventors are more likely to be licensed using profit-sharing agree-
ments; (ii) high fixed upfront payments increase the likelihood that a profit-sharing agreement is 
closed since risk-averse licensor are willing to sign the contract; (iii) high fixed upfront pay-
ments are correlated with higher profit shares. Hypothesis (i) should be rejected if inventor moral 
hazard was unimportant. Moreover, hypotheses (ii) and (iii) should be rejected, if the inventor is 
risk-neutral.  The first two hypotheses are evaluated using a probit model (see Table 4), whereas 























Fixed fee (in 1,000 
Mark) 
-0.016* -0.016*  -0.013  -0.014 
Individual  inventor  1.794*** 1.793*** 1.611*** 1.507*** 
Pre-patent licensing  0.568**  0.552**  0.478*  0.482* 
Inventor milestone  0.232  0.254  0.248 
Auditing right  -0.558*  -0.498 
Producer milestone  0.547* 
Constant  1.145*** 1.123*** 1.156*** 1.013*** 
   Marginal effect 
Fixed fee (in 1,000 
Mark) 
-0.006* -0.006*  -0.005  -0.005 
Individual  inventor  0.624*** 0.624*** 0.577*** 0.548*** 
Pre-patent licensing  0.216**  0.210**  0.182*  0.182* 
Inventor milestone  0.085  0.093  0.090 
Auditing right  -0.217*  -0.193 
Producer milestone  0.194* 
Constant  0.418*** 0.412*** 0.422*** 0.382*** 
McFadden R²  0.342  0.343  0.356  0.371 
Prob Chi² test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  180  180  180  180 
Method: Probit. *,**,*** denotes significance on ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
 
The Probit regressions employ a zero-one coded dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
contract specifies a profit share. The explanatory dummy variable ‘pre-patent licensing’ takes the 
value of one if the licensing contract is closed before a patent is granted for the licensed technol-
ogy. We expect a significantly positive coefficient for this variable. The dummy variable ‘indi-
vidual inventor’ takes the value of one if the licensor is an individual. We expect a significantly 
positive coefficient for this variable. The variable ‘fixed fee’ reflects the size of the upfront fixed 
fee (in 1,000 Mark) paid by the firm to the inventor. If the inventor is risk-neutral, this variable 
should be insignificant. If the inventor is risk-averse, this variable should be significantly posi-
tive. 
Our stability check employs three additional variables capturing contractual clauses. The dummy 
variable ‘inventor milestone’ takes the value of one if the licensing contract specifies a fixed 
payment of the firm to the inventor if a certain milestone is reached. Dechenaux et al. (2009) 
                                        
26   Using only observations from the chemical industry and using firm fixed effect does not affect the results. 
Results are available upon request.  18 
show that milestone payments can also be used to overcome the moral hazard problem between 
inventor and firm. Consequently, milestone payments can substitute profit shares – this would be 
reflected in a significantly negative coefficient – or they can complement profit shares – this 
would result into a significantly positive coefficient. Moreover, the dummy variable ‘producer 
milestone’ takes the value one if the contract specified a payment to the licensor if the producers 
reach some specified target. The model proposed by Decheneaux et al. (2011) suggests that risk-
averse licensees use this kind of instrument since it specified only a payment in case of a com-
mercial success of a product.  Table 4 presents the results.  
As expected, pre-patent contracting and contracting with individual inventors positively affects 
the probability of a profit sharing agreement. For non-patented innovations, the probability of 
closing a profit-sharing agreement is at least 18.2 percent larger than for a patented innovation. If 
the licensor is an individual inventor, the probability of agreeing on a profit-sharing agreement is 
at least 47.8 percent larger compared to the case with a firm as licensor. The marginal effect of a 
fixed upfront fee is slightly negative and generally insignificant. This can be taken as evidence 
for nearly risk-neutral licensors.  
Furthermore, the result regarding the inventor milestone suggests that inventor moral hazard was 
not the driving force behind profit sharing contracts. Uncertainty regarding future profits and 
risk-averse licensee are a more likely candidate. This claim is supported by the insignificant ef-
fect of inventor milestones on profit shares. If post contracting inventor effort is important inven-
tor milestones should substitute or complement profit shares. Producer milestones may affect the 
contract design. But the empirical evidence for this claim is rather thin since the variable is only 
marginally significant.    
So far, we were only concerned with the determinants of the probability of agreeing on a profit-
sharing agreement. We now turn to the quantitative effects of a contractual clause on the size of 
profit shares. From theory, we expect that higher fixed upfront payments are correlated with 
higher profit shares if the inventor is risk-averse. Moreover, early-stage inventions licensed by an 
individual inventor should have higher profit shares since more effort of the licensor is necessary 
to commercialise the innovation.   
The dependent variable in the regressions (5a) and (5b) in Table 5 is the mean profit share agreed 
upon in a contract. If the contract specifies different profit shares for different states of the world 
(e.g., levels of profits or output), we use the arithmetic mean of all profit shares mentioned in the 
contract. For example, a contract might specify a profit share of 10 percent for the profits gener-
ated by the first 10,000 units and a profit share of 5 percent for the profits from all other units. 
We then employ the mean profit share of 7.5 percent as dependent variable. The explanatory var-
iables are the same as above in Table 4. In addition, we use the first profit share agreed upon in 
the contract as dependent variable in regressions (5c) and (5d). Implicitly, the specification used 
in regressions (5a) and (5b) assumes that all states of the world specified in the contract have the 
same probability and we can use the average of all profit shares specified for different stats of the 
world as a dependent variable. However, inventor or producer effort might be more important to 19 
reach the first state of the world, whereas the other states of the world are dominated by events 
outside the control of the licensor and licensee, e.g., market demand or the existence of substi-
tutes. Table 5 presents the results based on a sample of 114 profit-sharing agreements. These 
contracts were all closed in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry.  











Fixed fee (in 1,000 
Mark) 
-0.074 0.193 -0.085 0.276 
Producer milestone  -5.379***  -5.568**  -4.745***  -3.528*** 
Inventor  milestone  0.412 -0.127 -0.317 -1.197 
Individual  inventor -3.479 -4.452 -6.142 -7.508 
Pre-patent licensing  -0.303  0.161  0.661  0.816 
Auditing 8.806  9.268  10.163**  9.911* 
BASF licensee  -30.560  -40.626 
Bayer licensee  -2.147  -1.399 
Hoechst licensee  -0.958  -3.771 
Merck licensee  0.937  1.997 
Constant  21.578*** 22.033*** 22.222*** 23.067*** 
adjusted R²  0.110  0.092  0.152  0.173 
Prob F-Test  0.005  0.027  0.005  0.001 
Number of observations  114  114  114  114 
Method: OLS with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
*,**,*** denotes significance on ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
 
In contrast to our theoretical expectations, neither the dummy variable capturing pre-patent con-
tracting nor the dummy variable capturing that the licensor is an individual affects the size of the 
profit shares. Moreover, the size of the fixed upfront payment does not affect the size of the prof-
it share.  
In some cases, contracts giving the inventor the right to inspect the accounts of the firm allocate 
a higher profit share to the inventor. We can think of at least two explanations for this finding: it 
becomes more important to have an auditing right if the profit share is higher; or inventors get-
ting the right to inspect the accounts might be inventors with substantial bargaining power. How-
ever, bargaining power and costly state verification is not included in licensing models. Moreo-
ver, milestones can, as expected from theory, be used as a substitute for profit shares. Including a 
producer milestone into the contract reduces the profit share agreed upon significantly, whereas 
inventor milestones turn out to be insignificant.  20 
V.   Conclusion 
We provide evidence that a modern licensing market emerged as early as 1880 in Germany and 
this market was quite similar to modern technology markets. Using a sample of 180 technology 
licensing agreements sealed by a sample of firms between 1880 and 1914, we show that licens-
ing contracts in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electrical engineering often contained fixed up-
front payments and in nearly all cases royalties based on profits, revenues, or physical output. 
Profit-sharing contracts were the most common type of agreement. Moreover, many contracts 
were sealed between individual inventors and firms. Consequently, profit-sharing or equity-
sharing licensing contracts are not a recent phenomenon as, for example, argued by Feldman et 
al. (2002) or Sampat (2006). Such contracts were already in use more than one century ago.  
A regression analysis reveals that contracts closed by potentially competing firms contained 
turnover sharing rules or per-unit royalties to account for strategic concerns of the licensor. 
Moreover, inventor moral hazard seems to be relatively unimportant, whereas uncertainty re-
garding the expected profits of a licensed technology were of outstanding importance for the de-
sign of technology licensing contracts. In contrast to some theoretical models, uncertainty was 
not dealt with turnover sharing clauses or per-unit royalties. Instead, profit sharing agreements 
and producer milestones dominated contract design. Thus, late 19
th and early 20
th century con-
tract designers were very efficient since the mostly agreed upon contract design without 
deadweight losses. Contract designs which are inefficient from a social welfare perspective were 
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